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CROSSING OVER:
ASSESSING OPERATION STREAMLINE
AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AT THE BORDER
Edith Nazarian*
Bent on curbing unauthorized immigration in the United States, the
Department of Homeland Security has implemented Operation
Streamline—a program aimed at criminally prosecuting all
unauthorized immigrants along a five-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico
border. While lauded by proponents as a success, Streamline has driven
courts to conduct en masse hearings that ultimately compromise
immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights. Although the Ninth
Circuit recently held in United States v. Roblero-Solis that these en
masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this Article argues that by basing its holding on a
procedural rule, Roblero-Solis fails to fully protect the rights of
immigrant criminal defendants at the border. To eliminate this problem,
this Article calls for courts to base these defendants’ rights on the
Constitution and to apply the civil theory of territoriality—and reject
the civil doctrines of plenary power and the ascending scale of rights—
in criminal proceedings. To help ensure the application of these
theories, this Article proposes a system that allows the courts to reduce
the number of unauthorized immigrants that it prosecutes and to
remedy any violations of the rights of the immigrants that it does.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., English, June 2009,
University of California, Irvine. My sincerest thanks go to Kathleen Kim, Professor of Law at
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, whose invaluable insight, guidance, and understanding
provided the environment that this Article needed to develop and truly flourish. Enormous thanks
also go to Andrew Lichtenstein for his editorial direction, thoughtful comments, and unfailing
support throughout the entire writing process. Without either of their assistance, this Article
would be a mere shadow of what it is today. I would also like to specially thank the staff
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review who reviewed and helped polish this Article
for publication. Finally, heartfelt thanks go to my family, friends, and peers for their continuous
support and encouragement. Indeed, to everyone who in some way touched this Article, you are
appreciated more than you know.
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It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard
for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf
of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that
by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.
—Justice Frankfurter1

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
implemented Operation Streamline (“Streamline”) to combat
unauthorized immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005,2 as
many as one hundred immigrants are brought in shackles each day to
a Tucson federal courthouse to be prosecuted for illegal entry.3
Streamline’s zero-tolerance policy of criminally prosecuting all
unauthorized immigrants,4 coupled with the sheer volume of
unauthorized immigrants being apprehended along the border,5 has
compelled the courts to conduct en masse hearings that ultimately
compromise immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights.6
Recently, in United States v. Roblero-Solis,7 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed Streamline’s shortcomings and held that en
masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.8 While the Roblero-Solis holding is undoubtedly a
positive step in protecting the rights of immigrant criminal
defendants at the border, it has not been a cure-all: even though
courts have changed their procedures in an effort to comply with the
Roblero-Solis decision, en masse proceedings in various forms still
1. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and the
Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 29, 2010),
http://migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=780.
3. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 142 (2009).
4. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2.
5. Since Streamline’s implementation in Tucson, Arizona, in 2008, for example, the district
has reportedly prosecuted about 30,000 persons. Stephen Lemons, Operation Streamline Treats
Migrants like Cattle, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/201010-21/news/operation-streamline-treats-migrants-like-cattle.
6. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2009).
7. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
8. Id. at 693–94.
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persist.9 Moreover, by narrowly grounding its holding in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and not the Constitution, the court
deprived these defendants of more protective rights by following a
pattern typically only necessary in civil immigration proceedings.10
This Article suggests that such an approach, if adopted by
subsequent courts, stands to undermine important constitutional
protections for immigrant criminal defendants. This Article further
recommends that, for criminal defendants prosecuted at the border,
courts should situate due process rights in the Constitution rather
than in specific statutes or procedural rules that are subject to
congressional change. In reaching this conclusion, this Article rejects
the application of the “plenary power doctrine,” which advocates
congressional deference in civil proceedings, and the “ascending
scale of rights” theory, which grants rights to unauthorized
immigrants only after they have gained substantial connections with
the country, in criminal proceedings. Instead, this Article argues that
courts should apply the theory of “territoriality,” which premises
constitutional rights on a defendant’s physical presence on U.S. soil,
in criminal prosecutions of unauthorized immigrants. In addition, this
Article proposes that courts should only criminally prosecute as
many immigrant criminal defendants as they can without depriving
these defendants of their full procedural rights. Should the courts fail
to protect these rights, then remedial efforts—such as dropping the
criminal conviction and giving the defendant the option to either
leave the United States voluntarily or go through civil removal
proceedings—should be implemented to alleviate the harm.
Part II provides background on Streamline and the Roblero-Solis
opinion. Part III discusses the way in which Roblero-Solis serves as
an example in a criminal case of what has been commonly seen in
the civil realm—namely, courts drawing from the Constitution but
ultimately granting rights to immigrants under statutes—and cautions
9. Lemons, supra note 5 (“And yet [even after Roblero-Solis], these en masse hearings
continue. And though Tucson magistrates now take pleas individually, some questions are still
asked of 70 people at a time or of smaller groups of seven at a time.”); see Joanna Lydgate,
Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, WARREN INST. 14 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf (“Tucson magistrate
judges are using a variety of different plea procedures to comply with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,
and while plea hearings are taking longer than they used to, the court still processes 70 Operation
Streamline defendants each day.”).
10. See infra Part III.

Summer 2011]

CROSSING OVER

1403

that this approach should not cross over into criminal proceedings.
Part IV offers a critique of the plenary power doctrine and argues
that it should have no place in criminal proceedings given the innate
differences between criminal and civil proceedings. Part IV further
argues that courts should strive to base their decisions on the
Constitution to preserve criminal defendants’ constitutional rights
from the reach of plenary power. Part V rejects the ascending-scaleof-rights model and argues that territoriality should prevail in
criminal proceedings. Part VI proposes a method for courts to ensure
that immigrant criminal defendants receive the full protection of their
procedural rights. Part VII concludes.
II. CHANGING THE IMMIGRATION LANDSCAPE:
AN OVERVIEW OF
STREAMLINE AND ROBLERO-SOLIS
This part begins by discussing Streamline—its policies and the
critiques that have been leveled against it—and how the program has
affected the United States’ treatment of unauthorized immigrants. It
then describes the Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. RobleroSolis and how that court attempted to respond to some of
Streamline’s concerns.
A. Border Enforcement Post-Streamline
Before Streamline, the U.S. government primarily regulated
immigration matters in civil proceedings.11 After 9/11, however, the
courts experienced an explosion of immigration-related
prosecutions.12 This explosion only augmented when, in 2005, DHS
implemented Streamline, a program intended to enforce the nation’s
immigration laws and secure its borders along a five-mile stretch of

11. Chacón, supra note 3, at 137. Indeed, the concept of immigration is so connected with
the civil sphere that scholars define “immigration law” as the “admission and expulsion of
aliens,” see, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (1984), with “expulsion” referring to
“deportation,” see id., a hearing that the Supreme Court has defined as “a purely civil action,”
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
12. Chacón, supra note 3, at 139 (“The prosecution of migration-related offenses exploded
in the wake of September 11, 2001. In 2004, U.S. magistrates convicted 15,662 noncitizens of
immigration crimes, and U.S. district court judges convicted another 15,546.”); see Lydgate,
supra note 9, at 2 (noting that federal magistrate judges witnessed their misdemeanor immigration
caseloads more than quadruple between 2002 and 2008).
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the U.S.-Mexico border.13 Before Streamline, Border Patrol officials
would either return first-time unauthorized immigrants to their home
countries or place them in the civil immigration system for
removal.14 However, under Streamline’s zero-tolerance policy,
officials within districts implementing the program must now refer
practically all unauthorized persons to criminal prosecution.15 Firsttime offenders are charged with the misdemeanor of illegal entry,
while those who have been removed previously and attempt to
unlawfully enter the United States again are charged with felony
reentry.16
Since Streamline’s implementation, DHS has lauded the
program as an effective deterrence against unauthorized
immigration.17 The program, which began in Del Rio, Texas, has
expanded to seven more of the eleven federal district courts that abut
the southwestern border18 and, because of its apparent success, may
expand to even more.19 Critics, however, have countered the claim
that Streamline serves as a deterrent by arguing that the incentive to
find work and reunite with family in the United States outweighs the
consequences of criminal punishment.20 They further contend that the
13. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2.
14. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 1.
15. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2 (noting that those excepted from prosecution include
“juveniles, parents traveling with minor children, persons with humanitarian concerns, and those
with certain health conditions”).
16. Chacón, supra note 3, at 142–43.
17. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that DHS “has consistently given Operation
Streamline credit for the reduction in apprehensions” of unauthorized immigrants at the border);
see Michael Chertoff, Turning the Tide on Illegal Immigration, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 24,
2008, 10:41 AM), http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/11/turning-tide-on-illegalimmigration.html (stating that the decrease in the number of apprehensions at the Streamline
districts of Yuma and Del Rio is “not [a] seasonal anomal[y],” but rather, a reflection of
“increased border security and the deterrence that comes with the prospect of spending time in a
federal detention facility”).
18. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 1. Those districts are: Yuma, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; Las
Cruces, New Mexico; El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; McAllen, Texas; and Brownsville, Texas.
Id. at 3. Although Streamline operates slightly differently in each of those districts, all of them
share the same zero-tolerance policy of criminally prosecuting all unauthorized immigrants. Id.
For an in-depth comparison of the Del Rio, El Paso, and Tucson districts, see Joanna Jacobbi
Lydgate, Comment, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 481, 496–514 (2010).
19. See Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program Success Are Unproven, NPR.ORG
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129827870.
20. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 7. Indeed, many unauthorized immigrants who have been
interviewed after emerging from criminal immigration proceedings have stated that Streamline
would not keep them from trying to reenter the United States. Lemons, supra note 5.
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poor economy, the increased cost of border crossings, and the risk of
death are the true causes for any decrease in border apprehensions.21
Because Streamline lacks deterrent value—and because of its
enormous cost22—several commentators have criticized it for
diverting the government’s attention from more serious crimes.23
Aside from the arguments against the program on a pragmatic
level, Streamline has spawned a number of troubling due process
concerns. Indeed, after being apprehended through the program and
spending usually a night in detention,24 up to one hundred
immigrants are brought in shackles each day to a courthouse to be
prosecuted for illegal entry.25 Often, these defendants are wearing the
same clothes that they wore during their journey26 and are
undernourished.27 Before trial, immigrant defendants briefly meet
with a defense attorney—who can represent anywhere from six to
forty defendants at one time—to determine whether they have any
defenses, such as citizenship or authorization to enter.28 If no defense
exists, then counsel generally enters mass guilty pleas on behalf of
his or her clients.29 Given the speed at which Streamline proceedings
are conducted, however, defenses are not always uncovered.30 As a
21. Lemons, supra note 5; Lydgate, supra note 9, at 5–6.
22. Streamline itself does not have a set budget, drawing resources from other agencies
involved in its implementation, such as Border Patrol, the federal judiciary, and the U.S.
Attorneys’, Marshals’, and federal public defender’s offices. Lemons, supra note 5. In Tucson,
Arizona, for example, DHS reportedly spends about $52.5 million each year to detain Streamline
defendants. Id.
23. See id.; Lydgate, supra note 9, at 7–8.
24. Chacón, supra note 3, at 146.
25. Id. at 142.
26. Id.; see Max Blumenthal, “We’re All Parasites.” This Is Operation Streamline, MAX
BLUMENTHAL (Feb. 15, 2010), http://maxblumenthal.com/2010/02/were-all-parasites-this-isoperation-streamline (“All of the migrants were young and brown-skinned, with combed black
hair, wearing the same clothes they wore during their perilous trek across the Sonoran Desert but
without the belts and shoelaces they were forced to surrender to prevent suicide attempts.”).
27. One Streamline defendant stated that, after being apprehended, Border Patrol officials
only gave her cookies and juice to consume, while another defendant described how Border
Patrol had thrown her the cookies instead of handing them to her. Lemons, supra note 5.
28. Chacón, supra note 3, at 143.
29. Id. In pleading guilty, defendants waive the right to a jury trial and the right to be
represented by counsel at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C)–(D). Virtually all Streamline
defendants, however, plead guilty given that “[d]emanding a trial would mean a month or more in
custody awaiting a trial date, far more time than a day or two of time served.” Lemons, supra
note 5.
30. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 14. A supervisor at the Federal Public Defender’s office in
Tucson, for example, has noted that there are times when she has discovered after a proceeding
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result, these en masse hearings have ultimately compromised
immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights—a concern that
the Ninth Circuit recently attempted to confront in United States v.
Roblero-Solis.
B. Roblero-Solis and Rule 11
On March 3, 2008, Abimael Roblero-Solis, Janet Roblero-Perez,
Jose Vasquez-Morales, Gumercindo Martinez-Carrizosa, Jorge
Rosales-Vargas, and Miguel Zarazua-Pichardo were apprehended by
Border Patrol inside the United States without documentation.31
Within the next two days, all six underwent one of two criminal
proceedings before a Tucson magistrate judge in which they pled
guilty to illegal entry with at least forty other defendants.32 During
these proceedings, their attorney, Assistant Federal Public Defender
Jason Hannan, objected to the court’s en masse procedure33 and
asked the court to address his clients individually to determine
whether they understood their rights.34 Hannan argued that the court
could not determine whether his clients knowingly and voluntarily
waived their rights unless it addressed them individually and that his
clients, moreover, had a right to address the court personally.35
After hearing Hannan’s objection in the first proceeding, the
court asked Hannan’s clients separately whether they understood that
pleading guilty forfeited their right to a jury trial before it returned to

that a defendant spoke an indigenous language and, thus, did not understand his hearing. Lemons,
supra note 5. At other times, she has learned that a defendant was a juvenile who should have
undergone an entirely different proceeding. Id.
31. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).
32. Id. at 694, 696. Roblero-Solis, Roblero-Perez, Vasquez-Morales, and MartinezCarrizosa, along with forty-three other defendants, appeared before Magistrate Judge Jennifer
Guerin on March 5, 2008, id. at 694, while Rosales-Vargas and Zarazua-Pichardo, whose
proceeding consisted of forty-eight other defendants, appeared before Guerin on March 6, 2008,
id. at 696.
33. In conducting proceedings, the Tucson court dealt with the following sorts of issues en
masse: advising the defendants of their rights, informing them of the consequences of pleading
guilty, asking the defendants whether they understood their rights and the consequences of
pleading guilty, asking counsel whether they believed that their clients were competent to plead
guilty and were doing so voluntarily, asking the defendants whether they committed the elements
of illegal entry, and sentencing the defendants to time served. Id. at 694–96. There were only two
instances in which the court addressed the defendants individually: when it accepted guilty pleas
and took roll. Id. at 694.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 697.
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addressing them as a group.36 In the second proceeding, however, the
court failed to even attempt to address Hannan’s objection.37 As a
result, all six defendants appealed their convictions, and their cases
came before four separate district court judges.38 Of these judges,
only one vacated a defendant’s conviction by finding that the court
had not resolved Hannan’s objection after he had clarified it; the
other three ultimately reasoned that the magistrate had not committed
any due process violations by conducting en masse proceedings
because the defendants had been represented by counsel during their
proceedings.39
On December 2, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Roblero-Solis rejected the district court judges’
reasoning by holding that en masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.40 Under Rule 11, a court
must “address the defendant personally in open court and determine
that [a guilty] plea is voluntary.”41 The Roblero-Solis court reasoned
that the term “personally” implies that the judge must address the
defendant not only in person, but also “in a personal manner.”42
Indeed, the fact that “personally” comes after “defendant” in the rule
underscores the notion that the judge’s speech must be made personto-person.43 Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit conceded that
proceedings containing more than one defendant do not necessarily
violate Rule 11, it nevertheless stressed that “no judge, however
alert, could tell whether every single person in a group of 47 or 50
affirmatively answered her questions when the answers were taken at
the same time.”44 Indeed, the court went on to say in even stronger
language that “[n]either . . . [a] medley of yeses nor a presumption
that all those brought to court by the Border Patrol must have crossed

Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 692–93.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 700 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1986)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

1408

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1399

the border” is enough to establish that a defendant has pled
voluntarily.45
In this way, Roblero-Solis can be seen as a significant decision
advancing immigrant criminal defendants’ procedural rights. At the
same time, however, the decision falls one step short of fully
protecting the rights of immigrant criminal defendants by holding
that en masse proceedings only violate the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and not the Constitution. Indeed, this omission becomes
all the more glaring by the fact that the Ninth Circuit referenced the
Constitution several times throughout its decision. For example, the
court began its opinion by describing the Tucson District Court’s
adoption of en masse proceedings as “intended to preserve the
rudiments of [Rule 11] and the [C]onstitution.”46 The court alluded to
the Constitution again when it discussed whether the case was moot,
given that the defendants had already served their sentences and had
apparently been deported.47 Ultimately, the court determined that the
case was not moot, reasoning that “[a]lthough we do not reach a
constitutional claim in this case, we believe that analogous
considerations counsel treating as alive these cases where the ‘time
served sentences’ are so short that no appeal would be practicable.”48
Interestingly, while the court denied explicitly ruling on a
constitutional issue, it discussed the Constitution once again when it
analyzed Rule 11’s use of the term “personally.” Indeed, after it
concluded
that
“personally”
mandates
person-to-person
communication between the judge and the defendant, the court
commented that “‘[p]erson’ and its derivative ‘personally’ carry
constitutional connotations.”49 In other words, the court appealed to
the principles of the Constitution to bolster its argument that en
masse proceedings violate a defendant’s Rule 11 rights, but it
declined to take the logical step of grounding its holding in the
Constitution.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 698.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 700.
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III. ROBLERO-SOLIS:
THE CROSSING OVER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL “PHANTOMS”
By allowing constitutional principles to guide its interpretation
of Rule 11, the Roblero-Solis court followed a pattern traditionally
observed only in civil proceedings.50 Professor Hiroshi Motomura
has described this practice of using statutes that draw from the
Constitution as decision-making based on “phantom” constitutional
norms, since the courts use statutes—and not the Constitution
itself—to impart rights to noncitizens.51 For example, in Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath52 an unauthorized immigrant challenged a statute
allowing immigration inspectors to preside over deportation cases in
which they had also performed prosecutorial tasks.53 The Supreme
Court held that deportation hearings must comport with the
Administrative Procedure Act, which prohibited such doubling of
duties, since doing otherwise would violate “procedural
safeguards.”54 Thus, although the Court based its reasoning on
legislative intent,55 the decision was a “phantom” because the Court
used a statute to determine a “constitutional due process matter.”56
Likewise, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding57 the U.S. government
denied Chew, a permanent-resident alien, reentry after a five-month
voyage on a U.S. vessel.58 Invoking § 175.57(b) of the Code of
50. For a discussion of the courts granting more favorable rights to noncitizens under
statutes than under the Constitution in civil immigration proceedings, see Deborah Anker, Jean v.
Nelson: Neutral Principles in the Supreme Court Without the Constitution, IMMIGR. J., Oct.–Dec.
1985, at 1, 10; STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 233, 239–41 (1987); DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN
IMMIGRATION LAW 19, 25–27 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
564–75 (1990).
51. Motomura, supra note 50, at 564 (“In immigration law, the ‘constitutional’ norms that
actually inform statutory interpretation—which are norms borrowed from public norms
generally—conflict with the expressly articulated constitutional norm—unreviewable plenary
power. The former are ‘phantom’ rather than ‘real’ constitutional norms in the sense that they do
not serve the first function of ‘constitutional’ norms—namely, direct application to constitutional
issues raised in immigration cases.”).
52. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
53. Id. at 45–46.
54. Id. at 52–53.
55. Id.
56. Motomura, supra note 50, at 569.
57. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
58. Id. at 592–95.
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Federal Regulations, the government furthermore denied Chew a
hearing since it believed that disclosing the reasons for Chew’s
exclusion would be “prejudicial to the public interest.”59 In his appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chew argued, first, that the regulation did
not apply to him and, second, that even if it did, the regulation
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.60 The
Court ultimately accepted Chew’s first argument, determining that
the regulation did not apply to Chew because his voyage on a U.S.
vessel did not terminate the rights he enjoyed as a lawful permanent
resident.61 In doing so, the Court was able to rule in Chew’s favor
without explicitly addressing whether the statute itself was
constitutional or implicating the plenary power doctrine.62
Wong Yang Sung and Kwong Hai Chew—indeed, all of the
immigration cases that Motomura discusses as having invoked
“phantom” constitutional norms63—were cases in civil proceedings,
which is the primary reason why Motomura does not necessarily
consider the courts’ use of phantom constitutional norms
negatively.64 For in civil proceedings, courts used statutes as a means
to circumvent the plenary power doctrine65—a doctrine that
originated in and has long pervaded civil proceedings to restrict
judicial review of congressional immigration acts.66 Under this
59. Id. at 592.
60. Id. at 595–96.
61. Id. at 600.
62. As the Court itself noted, “We do not reach the issue as to what would be the
constitutional status of 8 CFR § 175.57(b) if it were interpreted as denying to petitioner all
opportunity for a hearing.” Id. at 602.
63. Motomura, supra note 50, at 567–72 (arguing that Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966),
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), are all
cases involving “phantom” constitutional norms).
64. See Motomura, supra note 50, at 549 (“In my view, any fair assessment of phantom
norm decisionmaking should reflect deep ambivalence. On the one hand, it has been an
understandable and perhaps even noble response to the shortcomings of the plenary power
doctrine, and for that reason I do not intend the term ‘phantom’ pejoratively. More generally, the
use of phantom norms during a transitional phase may be a healthy form of constitutional change.
On the other hand, statutory interpretation confuses and contorts the law when the interpreting
court relies for an extended period on constitutional norms that are doctrinally ‘improper’ in the
sense that they do not control in cases which explicitly involve interpreting the Constitution.”).
65. See id. (“The result [of court’s relying on phantom constitutional norms] has been to
undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory interpretation.”).
66. See id. (noting that immigration law “has developed over the past one hundred years
under the domination of the plenary power doctrine”). The Supreme Court first invoked the
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), in which it upheld the
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doctrine, Congress possesses sovereignty over immigration matters,67
and the judiciary only rarely—if ever—considers constitutional
challenges on that subject.68
Roblero-Solis, however, is not a civil case but, rather, a criminal
one. As such, the Ninth Circuit would not have needed to avoid a
civil doctrine by grounding its reasoning on a “phantom” procedural
rule and not on the Constitution. The fact that the court did base its
holding on Rule 11, however, is all the more unsettling, as it suggests
that the plenary power doctrine persists not only in civil immigration
proceedings but in criminal immigration proceedings as well. Indeed,
by grounding its decision in Rule 11—a procedural rule subject to
congressional amendment69—the Roblero-Solis court has essentially
allowed the issue of immigrant criminal defendants’ procedural
rights to be subject to the will of Congress.70 By opening the door for
the plenary power doctrine to enter into criminal proceedings, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision has ultimately—and unfortunately—created
constitutionality of a law that denied a Chinese immigrant reentry to the United States, even
though prior to the immigrant’s departure, Congress had promised that he could leave the country
and return. See id. at 589; see also id. at 609 (“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may
have obtained, previous to the act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their
departure, is held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.”). For a
more detailed discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see Motomura, supra note 50, at 550–54.
67. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have
long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”).
68. Motomura, supra note 50, at 547. An example of a case that actually ruled favorably
toward noncitizens is Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), in which the Supreme Court held
that the government could not arbitrarily hold or deport a noncitizen who was within the United
States, even if his presence was unlawful, without giving him a hearing. Id. at 101.
69. See Foreword to FED. R. CRIM. P.
70. One might argue that Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), serves as a
counterexample to the assertion that courts are not establishing Constitution-based rights for
noncitizens. In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, an attorney
must advise his client whether pleading guilty to a criminal offense creates the risk of deportation.
Id. at 1486. However, Padilla differs from Roblero-Solis in two key ways. First, unlike RobleroSolis, Padilla is a Supreme Court case dealing with an issue that arose from state court. See id. at
1478. Thus, while Roblero-Solis could have been based on either the Constitution or the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court in Padilla could only ground its ruling in the
Constitution. While the Padilla majority could have accepted Justice Scalia’s argument that
statutory provisions, and not the Constitution, should remedy any effective-counsel concerns, the
reason that they did not likely stems from the second difference between Padilla and RobleroSolis. While both Padilla and Roblero-Solis dealt with issues affecting noncitizens, Padilla
involved a legally permanent resident, id. at 1477, whereas Roblero-Solis involved unlawfully
present defendants. This difference is important because, historically, the courts have treated the
former group more favorably than they have treated the latter. See infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
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the risk of producing followers. Roblero-Solis thus stands to
influence district courts in the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps even those
in sister circuits, to conclude that plenary power applies in criminal,
as well as civil, proceedings.
IV. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE:
A “CROSSOVER”
THAT SHOULD NOT OCCUR
If the Roblero-Solis opinion means that the plenary power
doctrine applies in criminal proceedings, we should be particularly
wary. Indeed, there are several reasons why the plenary power
doctrine should not apply to criminal proceedings of unauthorized
immigrants: scholarly debate, contemporary court rulings, and the
dangers inherent in the doctrine all counsel against it.
A. Plenary Power: A Doctrine on the Demise
Even though courts have evoked the plenary power doctrine in
civil immigration proceedings for at least a century, this has not
stopped scholars from disputing the doctrine’s legitimacy. Indeed,
some have attacked the doctrine by arguing that it has no
constitutional support in either civil or criminal proceedings. As one
scholar argues, although the Constitution does not overtly discuss
noncitizens’ rights, certain provisions in the Constitution suggest that
the Constitution’s framers never intended for plenary power to apply
to Congress in immigration matters.71 For instance, the fact that the
framers included the Naturalization72 and Migration and Importation
Clauses73 in the Constitution illustrates that they intended to place
constitutional limits on Congress’s power over immigration: if
Congress had inherent power over immigration, then these clauses

71. Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 713, 718 (1995).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization”).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”).
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specifically discussing Congress’s authority over the subject would
have been unnecessary.74
Regardless of the veracity of this argument, it nevertheless
remains that courts have relied on the plenary power doctrine in civil
proceedings.75 However, certain modern Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the doctrine’s stronghold over civil immigration
proceedings is loosening.76 Indeed, Landon v. Plasencia,77 Nguyen v.
INS,78 and Zadvydas v. Davis79 are all examples of immigration cases
in which the Supreme Court heard each case on its merits instead of
immediately deferring to Congress, as the plenary power doctrine
would require.80
In Plasencia, for example, a lawful permanent resident
challenged the constitutionality of an exclusionary hearing in which
she was denied admission into the United States after she had
attempted to transport several Mexican citizens into California.81
Although the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Plasencia
was entitled to a deportation hearing,82 it nevertheless accepted her
constitutional challenge and remanded the case to determine whether
her exclusion hearing comported with due process.83
Likewise, in Nguyen v. INS the Supreme Court analyzed an
equal protection argument brought by a lawfully present, removable
noncitizen under the intermediate standard for gender-based

74. Rosenfeld, supra note 71, at 718 (“Although the Migration and Importation Clause
primarily dealt with the slave trade, it is also thought to have addressed laws concerning nonslave migrants. However, if the framers had contemplated an inherent power over immigration,
the Naturalization provision and—to the extent that it addressed alien laws—the Migration and
Importation Clause would have been unnecessary.” (footnote omitted)).
75. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
76. Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How Immigration Law
Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 455, 479 (2008).
77. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
78. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
79. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
80. Pinix, supra note 76, at 479–82.
81. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 22–23.
82. Deportation hearings are now referred to as “removal” in civil proceedings. Chacón,
supra note 3, at 140 n.28 (“Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from
entering the country were termed ‘exclusion’ proceedings, while proceedings to remove a
noncitizen that had already entered the country were termed ‘deportation’ proceedings. [The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] consolidated exclusion
and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings ‘removal’ proceedings.”).
83. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 22.
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challenges instead of under the rational basis standard of review
typically connected with plenary power.84 The Court ultimately
found constitutional a statute that imposed different requirements for
attaining citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent is the
mother or the father.85 However, by choosing to entertain the
argument, the Court demonstrated more consideration of an
immigrant’s rights than the plenary power doctrine would allow.86
The Supreme Court further demonstrated the diminishing
influence of the plenary power doctrine in Zadvydas when it stated
that Congress’s power over immigration “is subject to important
constitutional limitations.”87 In Zadvydas, a lawfully present
noncitizen became removable after he committed a series of crimes.88
Zadvydas challenged a statute that allowed the government to detain
him over the set ninety-day period.89 Although the Court did not
strike the statute down as unconstitutional, it nevertheless interpreted
the statute to mean that the government could not detain a noncitizen
indefinitely,90 thus imparting a certain number of rights to a
noncitizen despite plenary power.
While these cases are not the norm in immigration
jurisprudence—rather, they are the exceptions in the judiciary’s long
history of plenary power91—they nevertheless illustrate that the
plenary power doctrine’s pull in civil immigration proceedings
appears to be weakening. Given this decline, it would therefore make
little sense to apply the doctrine in the criminal realm.
B. Plenary Power: The Dangers of Crossing Over
Possibly the greatest reason against applying the plenary power
doctrine in criminal courts, however, is the unique differences that
make criminal proceedings more punitive than civil ones. Indeed, by
84. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72.
85. Id. at 56–59.
86. See Pinix, supra note 76, at 481.
87. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
88. Id. at 684.
89. Id. at 682, 685–86.
90. Id. at 659.
91. See Pinix, supra note 76, at 479 (“As recently as 1999, the Court continued to defer to
Congress’s seemingly limitless power in the immigration arena. Thus, for over one hundred years
the Court has avoided constitutional challenges to immigration laws by relying on the plenary
power doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
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going through Streamline, immigrant criminal defendants now have
criminal records, which can potentially carry significant sentences.
For example, an immigrant criminal defendant convicted of illegal
entry can be imprisoned for up to six months, while one convicted of
illegal reentry can be imprisoned for up to two years.92 Furthermore,
defendants convicted of illegal entry and reentry face being
stigmatized as criminals—a repercussion keenly absent in civil
proceedings.93 Given the harshness of the plenary power doctrine
toward immigrants in civil proceedings, the doctrine seems all the
more ill-suited in the high-penalty setting of criminal proceedings.
Without the plenary power doctrine, it appears that criminal
immigration courts would be freer than their civil counterparts to
base their decisions on the Constitution rather than on statutes or
procedural rules. Granted, common-law tradition dictates that, when
given the choice between a statute and the Constitution, courts
should rule on the statute, as it is the narrower ground.94 In this way,
the Roblero-Solis opinion is not unreasonable. However, the court’s
outcome is also entirely consistent with the courts’ general ill
treatment of noncitizens in civil proceedings. Indeed, by avoiding the
constitutional argument, the Roblero-Solis court creates dangerous
precedent by leading other courts to protect the rights of immigrant
criminal defendants less than they would under a constitutional
ruling.
For instance, should the Roblero-Solis case reach the Supreme
Court and the Court hold that en masse hearings violate Rule 11, its
decision would only bind federal courts. A Supreme Court decision
based on the Constitution, on the other hand, would bind federal and
state courts alike. Indeed, although the topic of immigration is
largely a federal issue,95 state authorities have taken it upon
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006).
93. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1205 (1985) (“Almost every criminal punishment imposes some nonpecuniary disutility in
the form of a stigma . . . . There is no corresponding stigma to a tort judgment.”).
94. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This
rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter.”).
95. See, e.g., Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical Power of State and Local Governments to
Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899, 902–03 (1997).
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themselves to regulate immigration. In September 2005, for example,
the Texas Border Sheriffs’ Coalition began to implement Operation
Linebacker (“Linebacker”) in response to what it perceived as a
“lack of federal support along the U.S.-Mexico border.”96 The
program, like Streamline, aimed to increase border security,
particularly in high-crime areas.97 However, unlike in Streamline,
undocumented immigrants apprehended through Linebacker and
charged with state violations undergo state—not federal—
proceedings.98 What is more, the program appears to be growing,
with border-county sheriffs from California, Arizona, and New
Mexico all calling “to implement Operation Linebacker-type
activities across the entire southwestern border” with Texas.99
Given this trend of prosecuting immigrants in state courts, it
would be dangerous for federal courts not to base the rights of
unauthorized immigrants in criminal immigration proceedings on the
Constitution since the states might not follow suit. While states can
grant more constitutional rights to individuals than the federal
government can, they cannot grant less.100 Thus, when the
opportunity and ability exist for the courts to rule on the
Constitution, as they existed in Roblero-Solis, the courts should do so
as this will ensure that these defendants’ constitutional rights are
being protected, regardless of the kind of criminal proceedings that
they are in.
V. ASCENDING SCALE OF
RIGHTS AND TERRITORIALITY:
DETERMINING WHICH CIVIL THEORY
SHOULD CROSS OVER
INTO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
One may wonder why unauthorized immigrants who have only
been in the country a few days should receive so much constitutional
protection. After all, if our discussion of the plenary power doctrine
96. Adrian J. Rodriguez, Note, Punting on the Values of Federalism in the Immigration
Arena? Evaluating Operation Linebacker, a State and Local Law Enforcement Program Along
the U.S.-Mexico Border, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1226, 1247 (2008).
97. Id. at 1247–48.
98. Id. at 1248.
99. Id. at 1249.
100. James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1748
(1992).
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has established anything, it is that, in cases involving immigration,
courts have generally been reluctant to grant immigrants rights in
civil proceedings.101 Nevertheless, when courts have granted
noncitizens constitutional rights—that is, rights based on the
Constitution and not on statutes—they have usually based them on
one of two models: the ascending scale of rights or territoriality.102
A. The Ascending Scale: A Theory on the Rise
Under the ascending-scale-of-rights theory, the number of
constitutional rights that a noncitizen receives increases with his or
her voluntary connections with the United States.103 The Supreme
Court first described this theory in Johnson v. Eisentrager,104 a case
in which the Court held that enemy German nationals convicted of
engaging in military activities against the United States did not have
the right to test the constitutionality of their confinement.105 Still, the
Court observed, in dicta, that the United States has traditionally been
most hospitable to the lawfully present noncitizen, to whom it has
“accorded a generous ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society.”106
While the Court quoted Johnson’s ascending-scale language
three years later in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding107 and then again in

101. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
102. This is not to suggest that the two models are mutually exclusive; indeed, in making an
argument for an ascending scale of rights, the Court has relied on some form of territoriality as a
starting point at which the ascending scale begins. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.
Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him
certain rights . . . .”).
103. See Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from
Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 872 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court set forth a test,
sometimes called the ‘ascending scale of rights test’ or the ‘substantial connections’ test, by
which aliens are granted certain constitutional protections to the extent they have voluntarily
connected themselves with the United States prior to the encounter with the United States
government for which they seek constitutional protection.” (footnotes omitted)).
104. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
105. Id. at 765–67, 781.
106. See id. at 770. The Court then went on to note that these rights “become more extensive
and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and [that]
they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.” Id.
107. 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953).
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Landon v. Plasencia,108 it was not until United States v. VerdugoUrquidez109 that the Court applied the theory substantively to a case.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that a Mexican citizen who had
been arrested and brought into the United States to be prosecuted for
drug smuggling could not invoke the protection of the Fourth
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.110 In reaching this
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment refers to “the people” and, thus, only
applies to a group of persons who have formed such a connection
with the United States that they can be deemed part of its
community.111 As such, while Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the
United States was lawful, the Court stressed that it was also
involuntary and, therefore, not the sort of presence that constituted a
substantial connection with the United States.112 Although the Court
stated that it “need not decide” whether a prolonged stay in the
United States, such as a prison sentence, would place VerdugoUrquidez under the purview of the Fourth Amendment,113 it
ultimately reiterated Johnson’s view that noncitizens receive more
rights as their identity with society increases.114
Although Verdugo-Urquidez dealt with a lawfully present
noncitizen, the Court implied in dicta that unauthorized immigrants
must also have substantial connections with the United States for the
Fourth Amendment to apply to them.115 As a result, several lower
court decisions have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez as requiring
unauthorized immigrants to have substantial connections in order to

108. 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982).
109. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Although Verdugo-Urquidez dealt with the issue of the Fourth
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause in the criminal context, the case draws its logic
extensively from civil immigration cases, which is why it is discussed here.
110. Id. at 261–62.
111. Id. at 265–66.
112. Id. at 271.
113. Id. at 272.
114. Id. at 269.
115. See id. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal
Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 79 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1770 n.228 (2010) (noting that
Verdugo-Urquidez “might be read to suggest that unauthorized migrants lack constitutional
protections without some showing of connections to the United States”).
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invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.116 For example, in
United States v. Guitterez117 the District Court for the Northern
District of California applied the test and held that an unlawfully
present immigrant could not suppress evidence incriminating him as
a drug supplier because he did not possess “substantial connections
with the United States to be considered one of ‘the people.’”118 More
controversially,119 in United States v. Esparza-Mendoza120 the District
Court for the District of Utah held that an unauthorized immigrantfelon who had previously been deported was not entitled to the
search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment because he
lacked “sufficient connection to this country” by virtue of his illegal
presence.121 And recently, in Rasul v. Myers122 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that “[t]he long line of
cases dealing with constitutional rights of both lawful resident aliens
and illegal aliens establishes ‘only that aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the territory of the United
States and developed substantial connections with this country.’”123
116. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza,
265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14,
1997), vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999); Torres v.
State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 (Tex. App. 1991), vacated, 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992). While Motomura argues that the “prevailing view” is that unauthorized immigrants in the
United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, Motomura, supra note 115, at 1770, and
labels the cases that have applied Verdugo-Urquidez’s substantial-connection test as “outliers,”
id. at 1770 n.228, this does not change the fact that these cases exist and should not suggest that
they should be taken lightly. See James G. Connell, III & René L. Valladares, Search and Seizure
Protections for Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in
Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1997) (“Recent lower court cases
have raised the serious possibility that undocumented aliens in the United States are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment.”).
117. No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997),
vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at *1, *6, *22–23.
119. For scholarly criticism of the decision in Esparza-Mendoza, see VICTOR C. ROMERO,
ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 71–91
(2005); Anil Kalhan, Rights and Remedies: The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of
Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1195 n.229 (2008); Isabel
Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND.
L.J. 1557, 1581–83 (2008); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501,
2523 (2005).
120. 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 1271.
122. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
123. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
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B. A Dissent of the Ascending Scale
Although it appears that the ascending-scale approach has taken
root in the civil sphere,124 the theory should not cross over and apply
to unauthorized immigrants in criminal proceedings. One primary
reason is that the standard is much too vague. Although Rehnquist
argued that Verdugo-Urquidez lacked substantial connection with the
United States for him to be protected under the Fourth Amendment,
he never actually defined “substantial connection.” In fact, he
declined to do so.125
Interestingly, Rehnquist conceded the inherent difficulty in
defining “substantial” in his dissent in Craig v. Boren,126 a case that
held that gender-classified laws must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest for them to be constitutional.127 In
his opinion, Rehnquist criticized the word “substantially” as being
“so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences
or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation.”128 Indeed, the
term is elastic. So elastic, in fact, that if a noncitizen’s rights are
directly proportional to the substantiality of his connections, clear
judicial guidance would still be required to determine exactly when
he has formed a substantial connection with the country.129
124. See Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values
and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2084 (1993) (“A tiered
system of aliens’ rights has emerged. . . . The alien seeking initial entry ‘requests a privilege and
has no constitutional rights regarding his application.’ The admitted alien, however, is granted an
‘ascending scale of rights’ in relation to her ties to the United States . . . .” (footnote omitted));
see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 547 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that the law considers lawful permanent residents “to be at home in the United
States” and, thus, grants them “greater protections than other aliens under the Due Process
Clause” during removal proceedings).
125. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271–72 (1990) (“The extent to which
respondent might claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the
United States were to be prolonged—by a prison sentence, for example—we need not decide.”);
see Godsey, supra note 103, at 872 (“The Supreme Court has yet to clarify . . . what sort of
‘significant voluntary connection’ with the United States would suffice to trigger the protections
in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Court expressly declined to address the issue in VerdugoUrquidez.”).
126. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
127. Id. at 197.
128. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Indeed, of the courts that have considered whether a noncitizen has formed a substantial
connection with the United States, none have been precisely uniform in applying the test. See,
e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that “regular and
lawful entry of the United States pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and . . . acquiescence in
the U.S. system of immigration” (footnote omitted) satisfied the substantial-connection test);
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In this way, Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez
differed markedly from Justice Brennan’s dissent, which did provide
a bright-line rule. According to Brennan, Verdugo-Urquidez satisfied
the substantial-connection test by virtue of being subjected to U.S.
law.130 Indeed, if this were the test—namely, that constitutional
protections apply to noncitizens if they are subject to U.S. law—the
ascending-scale theory would not be difficult to follow.
However, Brennan’s clear-cut view did not prevail,131 and as
such, the ascending scale as it currently stands is untenable. This is
particularly true in criminal proceedings. Given that many
unauthorized immigrants who are prosecuted for illegal entry have
only been in the United States for a few days, courts are unlikely to
find the substantial connection necessary to grant these defendants
the full range of rights enjoyed by a citizen criminal defendant.132
Indeed, Verdugo-Urquidez only underscores this point by throwing
United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *17–22
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997) (reasoning that marrying a resident U.S. noncitizen, bearing and raising
a child in the United States, paying three traffic tickets, paying sales and use taxes on certain
items, and living in California for twelve years did not constitute a substantial connection with the
United States), vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999).
130. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Respondent is entitled to
the protections of the Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating him and
attempting to hold him accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a
member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws.”).
131. Granted, some legal scholars have argued that Verdugo-Urquidez’s majority definition of
“substantial connections” can be read as offering a clear-cut test. Although they concede that
Rehnquist never expressly defined “sufficient connection,” they nevertheless assert that the
opinion suggested the per se rule that a noncitizen establishes a substantial connection with the
United States by entering the country voluntarily. Connell, III & Valladares, supra note 116, at
1340–44. However, these scholars’ interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez is incorrect. For example,
although Rehnquist asserted that lawful but involuntary presence in the United States “is not the
sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country,” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271,
he immediately followed this statement by stating that “[t]he extent to which respondent might
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were
to be prolonged—by a prison sentence, for example—we need not decide,” id. at 271–72. By
juxtaposing these two statements, Justice Rehnquist therefore implied that voluntary presence
alone does not satisfy a substantial connection. Indeed, it is voluntary presence plus a prison
sentence—and this only might be sufficient. Furthermore, by assuming for the sake of argument
that the unauthorized immigrants in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), had Fourth
Amendment rights, and by stating that they, unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, “were in the United States
voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations,” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
at 272–73, Rehnquist established that the substantial-connection test requires not only voluntary
presence but societal obligations as well.
132. The language barrier and en masse proceedings hardly help alleviate this problem.
Moreover, while a prison sentence might extend the number of days in which a noncitizen
remains in the United States, it is unlikely that such a restrictive setting would foster meaningful
community ties sufficient to establish a substantial connection with the country.
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doubt on whether unauthorized immigrants are per se entitled to
Fourth Amendment rights. As such, the ascending-scale approach
should not apply to unauthorized immigrants in criminal
proceedings. Rather, the most appropriate model under which to
provide criminal defendants their constitutional rights should be
territoriality.
C. The Judicial Landscape of Territoriality
Despite the courts’ apparent predilection for the ascendingscale-of-rights model, courts have discussed noncitizens’ rights
solely on the theory of territoriality. Under this theory, an individual
receives rights from the sheer fact of being on U.S. soil.133 For
example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins134 a noncitizen challenged a San
Francisco ordinance that prohibited the operation of laundry
businesses without the board of supervisors’ consent.135 The Supreme
Court ultimately found that, by discriminatorily denying consent to
laundry businesses run by noncitizens, the ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 In
reaching this decision, however, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s mandate that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . []or deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”137 as
having “universal . . . application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction.”138 Indeed, in stating that due process applies to “all
persons,” the Court suggested that these rights apply to all classes of
immigrants; that is, to those who are in the United States lawfully as
well as unlawfully.
In Wong Wing v. United States,139 the Court not only accepted
Yick Wo’s territoriality analysis but expanded on it. Citing that
133. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 391 (2007) (“[T]he territorial conception of rights for
immigrants treats a person’s geographical presence itself as a sufficient basis for core aspects of
membership. . . . It says: once someone is in the geographical territory of the state, that person
must, for most purposes, be treated as fully in.” (emphasis in original)).
134. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
135. Id. at 356–58.
136. Id. at 373–74.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
139. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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decision’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Wong
Wing Court reasoned that noncitizens within the territory of the
United States must also be entitled to the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.140 As a result, the government could not sentence
a noncitizen to hard labor prior to his removal without first providing
a jury trial.141
The Court once again discussed territoriality in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei.142 While Mezei’s holding was ultimately
unfavorable to immigrants,143 it nevertheless conceded that
noncitizens—even those who are in the United States illegally—can
be removed “only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”144 Thirty
years after Mezei in Plyler v. Doe,145 the Court reaffirmed Mezei’s
reasoning by asserting that a person “within the State’s territorial
perimeter,” even one who unlawfully entered the United States and
can be expelled, “is subject to the full range of obligations imposed
by the State’s civil and criminal laws.”146 The Plyler Court, although
focused on the Fourteenth Amendment,147 furthermore reiterated
Wong Wing’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply
to all persons within the territory of the United States, even those
who are in the country illegally.148
Significantly, Plyler held that states could not prevent
undocumented immigrant children from accessing a public school
education under the Equal Protection Clause.149 Although scholars
have argued that the courts have limited the decision to its context,150
140. Id. at 238.
141. Id.
142. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
143. Indeed, the Court ruled that a noncitizen attempting to re-enter the United States can be
held indefinitely on Ellis Island upon the Attorney General’s judgment that the noncitizen posed a
risk to national security. Id. at 212, 215–16.
144. Id. at 212.
145. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
146. Id. at 215.
147. Id. at 205.
148. Id. at 212.
149. Id. at 230.
150. Motomura, supra note 115, at 1731–32 (“As a decision on constitutional claims by
unauthorized migrants, Plyler’s holding has been confined to the context in which it arose. The
Court’s equal protection rationale . . . relied so heavily on the involvement of children and
education that no court has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized

1424

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1399

the case’s territoriality analysis nevertheless remains relevant to the
question of whether noncitizens receive constitutional rights in the
first place.151 For instance, in Zadvydas the Court held that a statute
cannot be interpreted to mean that the government can hold a
noncitizen in detention indefinitely.152 In reaching this decision, the
Court relied on Plyler, as well as on Yick Wo and Mezei, to assert that
noncitizens within U.S. territory are protected by the Due Process
Clause “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary,
or permanent.”153
D. Territoriality: Providing the Grounds for Greater Rights
Although the territoriality cases did not expressly hold that
noncitizens on U.S. soil should receive the protections of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, no case expressly holds that
they do not receive these rights. Thus, even though other
considerations may have contributed to the Court ruling favorably
toward noncitizens,154 the fact that the Court has stated that
noncitizens should receive these rights supports the argument that
immigrant criminal defendants at the border should thus be entitled
to them. As Streamline demonstrates, however, such protections do
not comport with reality. Indeed, if it were settled law that the Fifth
Amendment protects immigrant criminal defendants, the courts
would not be conducting en masse proceedings in any form. As the
system currently stands, even on U.S. soil these defendants do not
receive the due process rights that the courts in the territoriality cases
purport they deserve. As such, this Article accepts a form of Justice
Brennan’s approach in Verdugo-Urquidez and argues that the courts
should grant immigrant criminal defendants the full range of criminal
migrants outside the context of K–12 public education.” (footnotes omitted)); see Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws
Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1927 (2000) (“Courts today, as has long been the
case, are generally unwilling to extend serious consideration to claims of rights by undocumented
noncitizens. Plyler v. Doe unfortunately has virtually no progeny of which to speak.” (footnote
omitted)).
151. See Motomura, supra note 115, at 1731 (arguing that “what matters is not whether but
how the Constitution applies to unauthorized migrants” (emphasis omitted)).
152. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
153. Id. at 693.
154. For example, in Plyler an important fact was that the unauthorized immigrants were
children seeking public education. Plyler, 345 U.S. at 230. In Zadvydas it was significant that the
removable noncitizen was subjected to prolonged detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85.
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procedural rights not simply because they are on U.S. soil but, more
importantly, because they are subjected to criminal prosecution.155
As discussed earlier in Part IV.B, the very nature of criminal
proceedings is punitive.156 In contrast, unauthorized immigrants in
civil removal proceedings have the chance to leave the country
voluntarily, if a lawful way exists, and avoid the criminal
repercussions of attempting to cross the U.S. border again in the
future.157 Such an opportunity, however, does not exist for immigrant
criminal defendants under Streamline.158 After undergoing criminal
prosecution and formal removal proceedings, these immigrants are
barred from lawfully entering the United States for at least five
years.159 Moreover, if they again attempt to cross unlawfully into the
country, they can be charged with illegal reentry,160 which bars them
from lawfully entering the country for another ten years.161 Thus, as a
result of being criminally prosecuted, these immigrants become not
only criminals but, moreover, criminals who face a host of legal
consequences.
Since immigrant criminal defendants face the legal
repercussions of a criminal prosecution, it only makes sense that they
should be entitled to the rights that come with being prosecuted in
such a proceeding. Justice Brennan expressed this view in Verdugo-

155. Indeed, in conveying rights to parties, at times it is not the proceeding’s geographical
location that is most important but the circumstances surrounding the proceeding that are. In
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), for example, the Supreme Court held that although
noncitizen-enemy combatants were detained at Guantanamo Bay, and thus were not in a country
where the United States held de jure sovereignty, they nevertheless were entitled to a habeas
corpus proceeding since the United States was in complete control of the territory in which the
detainees were held. Id. at 770–71.
156. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
157. ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 76 (2d ed. 2006). Voluntary departure can occur before the removal
hearing if the noncitizen can pay his or her way out of the country after immigration proceedings
have started, immediately before a master calendar hearing, or after a merit hearing has been
completed. Id.
158. See Josiah Heyman & Jason Ackleson, United States Border Security After 9/11, in
BORDER SECURITY IN THE AL-QAEDA ERA 37, 60 (John Winterdyk & Kelly Sundberg eds.,
2010) (“Standard Border Patrol practice involves offering the vast majority of Mexican border
arrestees a voluntary departure, which means almost immediate return to Mexico and no record of
having been deported. Operation Streamline involves setting up criminal charges for unauthorized
border entrants . . . followed by a formal deportation.”).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006).
160. Id. § 1326(a).
161. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
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Urquidez when he stated that “fundamental fairness and the ideals
underlying our Bill of Rights” require the government to give foreign
individuals certain rights when it expects these individuals to follow
its criminal laws.162 The argument therefore is not that unauthorized
immigrants should escape the consequences of breaking U.S. law,
but rather that if the United States chooses to impose
consequences—especially those that it deems to be beneficial by
serving as a deterrent—it should, in fairness, entitle these individuals
to the full procedural protections that they deserve in these
proceedings.
Indeed, fully protecting immigrant criminal defendants’
constitutional rights is crucial precisely because these defendants are
often those with the least number of ties to the United States, and
thus those whom we would deem least worthy of constitutional
rights. However, as Justice Frankfurter stated in Davis v. United
States,163
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard
for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf
of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that
by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.164
In other words, in failing to protect immigrant criminal defendants’
rights, the courts threaten to extinguish the rights of not only
unauthorized immigrants but of U.S. citizens as well. John Stewart,
who delivered the Virginia Resolution to the Virginia Assembly,
expressed this fear when he stated, “If a suspicion that aliens are
dangerous, constitute[s] the justification of that power exercised over
them by Congress, then a similar suspicion will justify the exercise
of a similar power over natives.”165 Thus, by protecting unauthorized
immigrants’ criminal procedural rights, the courts not only protect
the rights of U.S. citizens but also reassure the public that the justice
system is operating as it should: fairly. And territoriality—which,
unlike the ascending scale, is a clear-cut test—serves as the most
suitable model to achieve such results.
162.
163.
164.
165.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1999) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
328 U.S. 582 (1946).
Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND ’99; WITH JEFFERSON’S
ORIGINAL DRAUGHT THEREOF 8 (1832).
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VI. PROPOSAL:
SO WHERE HAVE WE
CROSSED OVER TO NOW?
Because territoriality should be the theory that prevails in
criminal immigration proceedings, the question then becomes one of
application and implementation into the system as it currently stands.
As this Article argues, to prevent injustice from occurring to
immigrant criminal defendants, courts should only criminally
prosecute as many defendants as they can without depriving the
defendants of their full procedural rights. It furthermore argues that if
the judicial system violates these defendants’ rights, it should give
the defendants the option to leave voluntarily or be placed in civil
deportation proceedings as a way to remedy the violation.
A. Step One: Where Prosecuting Less Means More
If we are to give immigrant criminal defendants greater
procedural rights, we must drastically decrease the number of
unauthorized immigrants being prosecuted in our courtrooms.
Although United States v. Roblero-Solis has led to a decrease in the
number of criminal prosecutions of these defendants in federal
district courts along the border, it has unfortunately not been enough
to eliminate all violations of defendants’ criminal procedural rights,
given that en masse proceedings, in one form or another, still
continue.166 For example, although magistrates in Tucson now take
pleas individually, they still ask certain questions to seventy
defendants at a time.167 Nevertheless, the number of defendants that
undergo Streamline shows no signs of flagging.168 Indeed, of the
2,613 immigration-related prosecutions in August 2010, the Justice
Department reported that 2,132—or about 82 percent—were
prosecutions for illegal reentry alone.169 Moreover, although
President Barack Obama signed a $600 million border security plan
into law that same month, the plan’s provisions failed to provide any

166. See sources cited supra note 9.
167. See Lemons, supra note 5.
168. Id.
169. IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS FOR AUGUST 2010 (2010), TRAC REPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyaug10/fil/ (last visited July 17, 2011).
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funds to ease the stress of the already overworked courts.170 In
Arizona, for example, the courts are able to prosecute only about
7 percent of the unauthorized immigrants that Border Patrol
apprehends daily.171 And yet, despite these numbers, many believe
that Streamline should be expanded to more districts.172
To ensure that criminal immigrant defendants receive their full
constitutional rights, courts must decrease their criminal caseload.
One way the courts can accomplish this is by only prosecuting
defendants who have committed more egregious immigration crimes,
such as drug smuggling or human trafficking. Unauthorized
immigrants who have been apprehended but have not committed
such crimes would then either be sent back home or be placed in
civil removal proceedings. In other words, these immigrants would
largely be treated as they would have been treated before
Streamline.173
Such a system achieves two important goals: not only does it
prosecute individuals who are more deserving of the consequences
and stigma that attach to a criminal conviction, but by diverting
border crossers away from criminal proceedings, it relieves the
federal criminal courts of a substantial caseload. This system
therefore frees up the courts’ time and revenue and, moreover, allows
the courts to ensure that defendants are receiving their full
constitutional rights. Indeed, with fewer prosecutions, criminal
defense attorneys would have more time with each defendant,
thereby increasing the chances that these attorneys will uncover
potential issues or defenses. Most importantly, prosecuting fewer
defendants eliminates the need for en masse proceedings. As a result,
courts will be able to ask defendants questions individually, thereby
assuring that each defendant’s response is knowing and voluntary.
Granted, Streamline’s advocates would argue that the program
deters unauthorized immigration and, thus, should remain as it
currently stands. As discussed above, however, Streamline may not

170. Amanda Lee Myers, Obama’s Border Plan Doesn’t Include Money for Already
Overwhelmed Courts, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
06/29/obama-border-plan-courts_n_630252.html.
171. See Lemons, supra note 5.
172. Robbins, supra note 19.
173. Other scholars have made a similar argument. See, e.g., Lydgate, supra note 9, at 16.
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be as powerful a deterrent as supporters believe it to be.174 If criminal
prosecution does not actually serve as an effective deterrent, it makes
little sense, then, for the United States to continue prosecuting as
many individuals as it currently does. Furthermore, given
Streamline’s questionable deterrent value and exorbitant cost, we are
left to ask ourselves: is it worth it? As this Article argues, it is not.
Thus, even if the implementation of this proposal results in
magistrate judges taking more time with each individual case, as the
Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Illinois,175 “[T]he Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”176
B. Step Two: “Removing” Procedural Deficiencies
For the various reasons discussed above, it is crucial that the
courts protect immigrant criminal defendants’ rights. If they fail in
doing so, a remedy should be put in place to ameliorate the offense.
One possible remedy that this Article suggests is for courts to drop
the criminal charge and place defendants in civil removal
proceedings where they have the option to voluntarily leave.
Doing so succeeds in serving many goals. For example, in
requiring the courts to redress a constitutional injury, the government
checks itself to prevent it from violating the procedural rights of
other defendants. Furthermore, if the government expects
unauthorized immigrants to obey its laws but does not follow
through with its own obligation to impart rights to these immigrants,
this Article argues that the system should try to ameliorate this
deprivation in order to comport with fundamental fairness. And
indeed, placing the defendant in a removal proceeding or allowing
him to depart voluntarily allows the defendant to evade the harshness
of a criminal conviction. At the same time, it also accomplishes the
government’s goal of decreasing unauthorized immigration by
requiring the defendant to leave the country. In this way, the
government not only protects those who are under its power and
within its boundaries but also advances its desire to deter crime.

174. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
175. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
176. Id. at 656.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the fear of terrorism and crime has translated to
harsher treatment of immigrants in the United States.177 While this
harshness has manifested itself in several ways,178 possibly the
severest treatment is that which has occurred in the criminal
prosecutions of unauthorized immigrants at the border. Although
Roblero-Solis was a positive step for the rights of unauthorized
immigrants, by not basing its ruling on the Constitution, the RobleroSolis court opened the door for the plenary power doctrine to enter
into criminal proceedings. And given the current treatment of
unauthorized immigrants at the border, it is not difficult to see
plenary power already taking hold in our criminal courts.
Unauthorized immigrants are bound in shackles and herded through
a judicial system one hundred at a time in what one Tucson judge has
described as “assembly-line justice.”179
As this Article has argued, this treatment must change. In the
criminal proceedings of unauthorized migrants, the courts should
base their rulings on the Constitution, not on statutes, and apply the
civil theory of territoriality rather than the ascending scale of rights.
To implement this change, courts must prosecute fewer defendants
and give those defendants whose rights have been violated the
opportunity to either leave the country voluntarily or enter civil
removal proceedings. A system that fully protects the rights of
immigrant criminal defendants comports not only with justice but
with humanitarian principles as well. It only makes sense, then, that
the United States must cross over to such a system.
177. KEVIN JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 49 (2009) (“Bent on curbing undocumented immigration,
deporting criminal aliens, protecting the nation from terrorists, and guarding the public fisc,
Congress passed a series of ‘get tough on immigrant’ laws.” (citing the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996);
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996))).
178. For example, criminal sentencing judges no longer have the power to recommend against
deporting noncitizens after they have been convicted of a deportable crime. Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 498 (2007). Furthermore, while once the government
could not deport noncitizens after a certain period of time elapsed, today statutes of limitations on
deportation no longer exist. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (2010).
179. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 12.

